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WAGES, EFFORT AND PRODUCTIVITY
Stephen Nickell and Daphne Nicolitsas
Introduction
Many people believe that companies which are doing well pay their workers
more than companies which are doing badly.  Another commonplace belief is that
paying workers well motivates them to work harder, and thus enables the company
which employs them to improve its performance.  It is clear from this that the causal
relationships between pay, effort and company performance are nothing if not
complex.
In the market for labour, the forces of competition will generally ensure that
individuals who are consistently hard-working will obtain higher wages.  Aside from
this, what other forces might be at work?  Suppose, for example, that pay results
from a firm-union bargain.  Suppose further that the union side is concerned with
both wages and job security.  Then any exogenous factor which generates a ceteris
paribus improvement in job security leads to the union achieving higher wages in the
bargain.  Examples of such factors include an increase in the market power of the
company or an improvement in its financial position.   So this implies a direct causal1
link between the improvement in company performance and the subsequent increase
in pay.  This link can also apply in non-union firms if the improvement in
performance is associated with an increase in product market rents or free cash flow
which is then shared with the employees.
Where might employee effort enter this story?  In the majority of union plants
in Britain, bargaining takes place over effort as well as pay.   In this case if an2
improvement in the financial position of a company, for example, leads to the union
obtaining a bigger pay increase, such an improvement will also enable it to bargain
for lower effort.  So in this context, we might expect to observe an improvement in
company performance generating both an increase in pay and a reduction in effort.
We could, therefore, observe a negative relation between effort and pay in response
to certain types of shock.
2Where does this leave the motivation argument noted at the beginning of this
section?  The use of pay to motivate workers is a standard idea in the literature on
human resource management, and comes in very direct forms such as piece rates or
performance related bonuses.  The efficiency wage literature has generated a more
subtle notion in the form of the shirking model (see Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  The
difference here is that while performance pay relates wages to readily observed
outcomes, the shirking model generates a positive relationship between effort and
pay in situations where individual effort is not readily observed.  The idea here is
that higher pay leads to a reduction in shirking because the penalty for being caught
shirking, namely job loss, is more serious if wages are higher.
Our purpose in what follows is to try and shed some light on these issues
using longitudinal data on a group of UK manufacturing companies, including some
information on changes in observed effort.  We shall investigate a number of
questions.  First, can we detect a relationship between our measure of observed effort
and company productivity?  Second, controlling for observed effort, can we detect
any efficiency wage effects on productivity?  Third, do increases in market power or
improvements in the financial position of companies lead to higher pay rises and
reductions in effort?  Our main focus will be on the first and third questions.  The
second we see as a more speculative endeavour because the detection of efficiency
wage effects in a production function framework is fraught with problems.
1.  The Analytical Framework
In this section we consider the theoretical and empirical background to the
determination of productivity and to the determinants of wages and effort in a
bargaining framework.
The determinants of productivity
The basis of our analysis is the production function.  Output is a function of
labour, capital, working hours plus the "effort" of both operatives and managers.
Here we use the term "effort" in a broad sense to cover anything that workers and
managers do to improve company productivity which raises the disutility of work.
Increased effort will raise measured efficiency (the level of productivity) and,
particularly in the case of managerial effort, it may also raise productivity growth as
managers continuously search harder for better ways of doing things.
First, consider these growth effects.  An interesting hypothesis, which is
extensively analysed in Nickell (1993), is that managerial effort is influenced by the
extent of product market competition.  That is, competition acts as a spur to
managers, leading to a higher rate of productivity growth.  This idea will be
investigated in what follows but will not be our main focus.  Here we concentrate on
level effects, particularly the role of efficiency wages.
As we have already noted, it is important to recognise that efficiency wage
effects operate via unobserved effort.  In the standard shirking model of Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), shirking is not readily observed and higher (unobserved) effort is
induced by paying wages in excess of outside opportunities.  This works because the
firm undertakes some limited monitoring of workers and if they are caught shirking,
they lose their jobs.  The higher the wage relative to outside opportunities, the greater
the cost of job loss and the greater the incentive not to shirk at given levels of
monitoring.  If worker effort is readily observed, the uniformly higher wages are
3(1)
unnecessary because workers can be paid directly in relation to their effort.
In reality, of course, there are both observed and unobserved aspects to
individual effort and it is only the latter to which efficiency wage arguments apply.
For example, observed effort includes, most obviously, hours of work, and also
manning ratios on machines and the flexibility of working practices.   Less readily3
observed aspects of effort relate to intensity of work, care taken over quality, and the
like.
In order to capture these effects, we use a constant returns log-linear
production function of the form
where y = output, n = employment, k = capital stock, h = working hours, e  =o
observed effort, e  = unobserved effort, g = productivity growth and g = all otheru
factors.  i is the firm index, t is the time index, $  is an unobserved firm effect and $i t
is a time effect.  The latter two variables capture all time invariant firm specific
factors and all time varying factors common to all firms.  In our empirical work, the
most important purpose served by this model is to check that our measure of
observed effort really does influence productivity.  We shall also, however,
investigate competition effects on productivity growth by supposing that
g  = g(competition ) (2)i i
 +
and efficiency wage effects via unobserved effort by specifying
e  = e (W /W ,u ), (3)uit u it t jt
       +    +
where W /W = relative wages and u  = the industry unemployment rate.i j
What do we know about these effects?  On the efficiency wage front, we have
some direct firm level production function evidence that wages influence productivity
(see Wadhwani and Wall, 1991 and Levine, 1992).  Unfortunately neither of these
studies control for observed effort and the former does not control wages for skill-
mix either.  These omissions naturally create a potential correlation between
productivity and wages which can corrupt the relationship we are looking for.  Other
production studies tend to use more aggregative data and generally find a positive
unemployment effect on productivity.  (See Oster, 1980; Rebitzer, 1988 or Green and
Weisskopf, 1990, for example).
Concerning competition and productivity growth, Geroski (1990) finds clear
evidence that increases in monopoly power tend to reduce the rate of innovation and
hence productivity growth.   Nickell (1993) finds evidence that firms with a large4
number of competitors tend to have higher (total factor) productivity growth than
those facing less competition.  Otherwise there is little evidence available.
4(6)
(7)
(8)
The determination of observed effort and wages
Since this is to be the main focus of our empirical investigation, it helps if we
can pin down rather precisely the implications of a simple theory.  Here we suppose
that firms and unions bargain over wages and effort, and then, output, employment
and prices are determined via a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  The industry setting is
that described in Nickell (1993).  There are n firms producing a homogeneous good.
Firm i has technology
Y  = N (E N ) , "<1 (4)i i i i
"
where Y is output, N is employment, E is observed effort and N reflects other factors
influencing firm productivity.  Industry price P satisfies
P = [EY /Y ] (5)i d
-1/0
where Y  is a demand index and 0 is the industry demand elasticity.d
The sequence of events is as follows.  First firm and union pairs bargain
independently about effort, E , and the wage, W .  Then firms in the industry seti i
output and employment at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  At the second stage, we
can show that employment in firm i satisfies
where MS = Y/EY , the market share of firm i.  Using this and (4), (5), we can showi i k
that the market price P satisfies
This enables us to show that 
and that profit, B , isi
5(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
Turning to the first stage, we use the generalised Nash bargaining framework.
The union contribution to the Nash bargain we specify as [W g(E )-U6 ]N , which isi i i
consistent with a utilitarian union objective.  W g(E ) is the utility of a representativei i
union member and U6  is the utility which the union member can obtain outside the
firm.  The contribution of effort to utility, g(E ), is assumed to be decreasing in efforti
at an increasing rate (g′ < 0, g" < 0).  Taking the firm's contribution to the Nash
bargain to be its profit, the Nash objective has the form
where $  reflects the power of the union in the bargain.i
In order to introduce financial pressures on the firm arising from high levels
of debt, say, we simply constrain the firm to make a profit greater than some fixed
amount Bˆ , in order to cover debt servicing, for example.  So wages and effort arei
determined by solving
The Lagrangian for this problem is given by
and, using (9), the Nash bargain reduces to solving
The first order conditions are
6(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
where
Furthermore, there is the usual complementary slackness condition,
Some elementary manipulation then yields
For our purposes, the relevant comparative static results are
Since 8  is non-decreasing in the profit constraint, Bˆ , these results indicate that ani i
increase in financial pressure or a reduction in market power (fall in market share)
will lead to an increase in bargained effort and a reduction in wages.  The utility
available outside the firm, U6 , is a function of outside opportunities.  In particular it
will depend positively on outside wages and negatively on aggregate unemployment.
Changes in these variables will influence wages but not effort in this simple
framework.  Finally it is worth noting that (16) implies that for a given state of the
outside labour market, wages and effort move in opposite directions.  It is our
purpose to investigate all these hypotheses with our company data set.
Evidence on the impact of market power and financial pressure on wages is
now readily available.  For example, Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) and Carruth and
Oswald (1989) provide clear evidence that financial pressure lowers pay, and the role
of market power in enabling managers to pay higher wages is clearly demonstrated
in Veugelers (1989), Stewart (1990), Konings and Walsh (1993) or Nickell et al. (1992).
However, there is not direct evidence that these same forces shift effort in the
opposite direction.  It is our investigation of this issue which is our main claim to
7originality.
2.  The Empirical Formulation
We shall use panel data on UK manufacturing companies to investigate the
various hypotheses discussed in the previous section.  Our basic data source is the
published accounts of 66 UK manufacturing companies over the period 1979-86.  All
the companies are unionised.  Added to these data is information from the annual
Confederation of British Industries (CBI) Survey of wage settlements which has been
matched to the accounting data.   We shall discuss some of the data definitions here5
because they have important implications for the interpretation of the results.
Complete definitions may be found in the appendix.
The productivity equation
This is based on the model set out in the previous section in equations (1), (2),
(3).  The following variables are of particular interest.
Employment elasticity, " .  This coefficient is equal to µ s , where µ  is the mark-upi i i i
of price on marginal cost and s  is the share of labour (see Hall, 1986, for example).i
Since we have no accurate measures of µ , we either treat "  as a constant or supposei i
it to be a linear function of the (average) share of labour for each firm.
Hours, h .  We follow Muellbauer (1984) and use " (H /H ) + " (H /H )  whereit 11 ojt njt 12 ojt njt
-1
H  measures overtime hours per worker in industry j and H  measures standardoj nj
hours per worker.  This captures the asymmetry arising from the fact that measured
hours tend to overstate actual hours worked in slumps.
Observed effort, e .  The only variable available is from the CBI data set andoit
measures a change in observed effort.  It is a dummy variable which takes the value
1 if the annual wage settlement includes an agreement by workers on the removal
of restrictive practices.  These include the elimination of inefficient work practices, the
removal of demarcation rules about which sorts of workers are allowed to undertake
which sorts of jobs, and generally involve an increase in the flexibility of the
workforce.  This typically reflects an increase in "effort" on the part of workers, both
in the literal sense and in the sense that eliminating restrictive practices raises the
disutility of work.
Unobserved effort, e .  Here we simply follow the standard efficiency wageuit
formulation (equation (3)) and utilise relative wages and industry unemployment.
Aggregate unemployment effects are absorbed in the time dummies.
Competition .  The variables we have available here include the average market sharei
at the firm level, the average concentration ratio and import penetration in the
industry in which the firm is located, and a firm based measure of rents.  Our
measure of market share is not satisfactory as a relative or cross-section indicator of
market power because the denominator refers to (3 digit) industry sales, which is
simply not the correct `market'.  Furthermore, its relationship to the correct market
will vary systematically across industries.  So, while time series fluctuations in this
variable may well capture quite accurately variations in the true variable over time,
8as a cross-section variable it is useless.  The industry variables may be of some value,
but in our view, the rents variable is the most promising.  We have computed for
each firm a measure of rents normalised on value added averaged over a ten year
period.  Rents are defined as pre-tax profits plus interest payments and depreciation
less the product of the cost of capital and the capital stock at current replacement
cost.  The idea is that firms facing less competition will generate higher rents in the
long run.  Of course, what we really require are potential rents since part of our basic
argument is that these are dissipated in the form of lower effort or captured in the
form of higher wages.  So what we have is a measure of the rents that the
shareholders obtain.  Insofar as these are roughly proportional to potential rents, this
variable is satisfactory.
So the equation which serves as the basis of our investigation of 
9(19)
company productivity has the form
where y  = output, n  = employment, k  = capital stock, H  = overtime hours, H  =i i i oj nj
standard hours, mkshi . = average market share, conc . = average 5 firm industryi j
concentration ratio (3 digit), imp . = average industry import penetration (3 digit),j
rents . = average rents per unit of value added, d = two digit industry dummies, RRPi j i
= reduced restrictive practices, (i.e.  if RRP is high, the level of restrictive practices
is low and effort is high) w  - w = relative wage, u  = industry unemployment, i =i j
firm, j = industry.  We have allowed simple dynamics in the equation in the form of
a lagged dependent variable, to capture the possibility that whenever a factor of
production is changed, it takes some time for output to reach its new long-run level.
The key variable influencing productivity growth is that capturing product market
power in the form of rents, namely rents . .  The other variables, namely marketi
share, concentration, import penetration and industry dummies (d ) are includedj
simply as controls.  We have already noted that our measure of market share is not
adequate in a cross-section context.  Concerning productivity levels, we have lower
levels of restrictive practices (RRP) capturing observed effort, and relative wages and
industry unemployment to pick up efficiency wage effects.  These are all lagged one
period in order to allow them time to influence productivity, and to try and eliminate
reverse causality effects.
In order to estimate the parameters of (19), we eliminate the firm effects ($ )i
by taking first differences to obtain
10
(20)
This has certain implications.  First, the error term will contain productivity shocks
associated with both employment composition and intensity of factor use.  So we
must treat both current employment and capital as endogenous.  Furthermore, after
differencing, y  is also correlated with the equation error.  However, so long as theit-1
basic error, ,  , is serially uncorrelated, then all lags on y, n and k beyond t-2 areit
valid instruments.  IV estimators based on this fact have been proposed by Arrelano
and Bond (1991) and are used here.  Second, it is worth noting that our data on
restrictive practices and company wages come in first difference form.  For the
former, we know when restrictive practices are reduced (i.e.  )RRP takes the value
1 if restrictive practices are reduced, zero otherwise).  For the latter, we have
information on the percentage pay rise for a particular manual group in the pay
settlement.  For present purposes, this is particularly valuable because it cuts out both
hours effects and skill composition effects, both of which generate natural positive
correlations between average earnings and productivity.  However, there is still the
danger of reverse causality for both restrictive practice and efficiency wage variables
(i.e.  firm does badly and so removes restrictive practices, firm does well and pays
higher wages), so as well as lagging, we treat all these variables as endogenous.
The wage/effort model
This is based on the theoretical model set out in the previous section.  The
results in (17) and (18) indicate that both wages and effort are functions of market
power and financial pressure, but only the former is influenced by external labour
market factors, notably outside wages and unemployment.  Our measure of market
power is simply the market share of the company concerned, but as indicators of
financial pressure we use three variables, namely profits per employee, B/N, a flow
measure of the pressure of debt, br, and a variable which captures the extent of the
shock hitting the company in the recession of 1979-81 (shock).  To be more precise,
B/N measures pre-tax profits per employee, br is a flow borrowing ratio measured
by interest payments as a proportion of pre-tax profits plus interest payments and
depreciation, and "shock" is equal to the proportional fall in employment from 1979-
81 for the years 1982 to 1984 and takes the value zero for other years.  So this last
variable is only allowed to affect the firm for three years after the end of the
recession.  The idea behind these variables is that the firm is under more financial
pressure, the lower are profits per employee, the higher are interest payments as a
proportion of total available cash flow and the greater the shock generated by the
1979-81 recession.  The first two should be lagged, since current financial pressure is
11
(21)
determined by past financial performance.
The wage equation is based on the notion that nominal wages are influenced
by outside nominal wages and nominal profits per employee (lagged) plus other
factors.  To preserve homogeneity, we thus have
W  = (1-8)W +8(B/N )  + ....it t i i t-j
We cannot use ln(B/N) because B is sometimes negative, so we proceed as follows.
Taking differences yields
       )W  = (1-8))W  + 8)(B/N )  + ....it t i i t-j
or
or
Adding in the other variables and including a lagged dependent variable to pick-up
contract related persistence, we have
where B/N  = nominal annual profit per employee; W  = annual aggregate pay; bri i t
= flow borrowing ratio; mksh = market share; Shock = 1979-81 proportional fall in
employment for the years 1982-84, zero otherwise; u = aggregate unemployment rate.
Note that we have arranged the equation so that the first bracket contains the firm
specific factors arising from market power and financial pressure, whereas the second
bracket captures the impact of the external labour market.  The difference form
ensures that stable firm specific factors influencing the level of wages are already
eliminated.  To impose homogeneity, we rewrite (21) as
12
(22)
13
(23)
Corresponding to this equation is the effort model, where the dependent
variable is )RRP which takes the value 1 if the wage settlement involves an agreed
reduction in restrictive practices and zero otherwise.   In case there are systematic6
industry variations in this variable because of industry based technological or
industrial relations variables, we include industry dummies (d ) as well as thej
variables in (22).  Normalising profits per employee on the aggregate price level, we
specify the equation as
The key hypotheses are that the firm specific factors which influence wages have the
opposite effect on effort and  that aggregate variables, notably unemployment, have
no impact on effort at all (*  = 0).  An alternative way of investigating these4
hypotheses is simply to estimate an equation based on (16), where we see that wages
and effort have a stable negative relationship at given levels of outside variables.
This suggests we estimate a simple dynamic equation of the form
    )(w -w ) = T  + T )(w -w ) - T )RRP (24)it t t 1 it-1 t 2 it
using the lagged firm specific variables in (23) as instruments for )RRP.  The time
effects T  capture all the relevant aggregate variables and so we are simply lookingt
for a negative coefficient on the effort term.
3.  Results
We shall first briefly consider the productivity results and then turn to our
main matters of interest, namely the impact of market power and financial pressure
on wages and effort.
Productivity results
The parameter estimates of the production function model (equation 19) are
set out in table 1.  We have a basic constant returns Cobb-Douglas equation in
column 1, followed by a CES version in column 2.  If we relax constant returns, we
find a production function which exhibits diminishing returns and which is not
significantly different from the equation in column 1 (t=1.2).  If we include the share
of labour interacted with the employment term, in addition to the existing terms, the
extra variable is completely insignificant.
Three results are of interest.  First, and most important, lower levels of
restrictive practices lead to significantly higher levels of productivity.   So treating7
this as an observed effort variable seems quite sensible.  Second, firms with higher
average rents per unit of value added have lower levels of productivity growth.  Note
this variable maintains its coefficient when average firm size is allowed to influence
productivity growth (column 3) whereas the positive market share effect simply
disappears, emphasising its lack of value in a cross-section context.  So this provides
14
evidence that market power; as measured by rents accruing to shareholders, is bad
for productivity growth at the firm level.
Finally, the efficiency wage terms are correctly signed and either significant or
close to significance.  So this is weak evidence in favour of such effects.  Furthermore
it is worth noting that if we drop observed effort (RRP) from equation 1, the
coefficient on relative wages rises by around 40% with a t ratio of 2.9.  This indicates
how important it is to control for observed effort if we are to identify efficiency wage
effects using the production function model.
Wages and effort
The theory of wage and effort bargaining indicates that in response to an
adverse internal shock, bargained wages will tend to fall and bargained effort to rise,
holding constant general labour market conditions.  To see if this holds in practice,
we estimate equation (24), the results being set out in table 2.  These indicate a strong
negative relationship between wages and effort in response to adverse internal shocks
(which are used as instruments), holding aggregate conditions constant (via the use
of time dummies).  Thus following an increase in financial pressure, for example,
firms have lower than usual pay rises and are more likely to gain union agreement
to a reduction in restrictive practices.
In table 3, we present both wage change and effort change equations which
make clear what is going on.  The key internal shock variables are captured by
changes in market share (mksh),  profit per employee (B/N), the burden of interest8
payments (br) and the proportional fall in employment during the 1979 to 1981
recession (shock).  The first two are favourable shocks and therefore have a positive
effect on wages and a negative impact on effort whereas the latter two variables are
unfavourable and act in precisely the opposite direction.  The parameter estimates in
table 3 are completely consistent with this story.  Not all the parameters are
significant but the overall picture is compelling.  Furthermore, it is clear that
aggregate conditions in the labour market have a strong impact on wages but no
effect on effort, exactly as predicted by the theoretical comparative static results (17,
18).
Conclusions
In the introduction we posed three questions.  Our answers, based on an
analysis of longitudinal data for some 66 manufacturing companies in Britain, are as
follows.  First, our measure of increases in observed effort, namely agreed reductions
in restrictive work practices, do lead to subsequent increases in productivity.  Second,
controlling for observed effort, there is some weak evidence that both relative pay
and aggregate labour market slack have some positive impact on productivity.  This
is consistent with an efficiency wage story.  Third, falls in market power or declines
in the financial health of companies lead to both lower pay rises and increases in
effort (higher chances of reductions in restrictive work practices).  This last we see
as our most robust and important result.
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1. For example, an improvement in the financial position of a company will
reduce the risk of bankruptcy and hence improve job security.  For evidence on the
impact of financial position on employment, see Nickell and Wadhwani (1991).
2. For example, in 1980 bargaining took place over manning levels (i.e.  workers
per machine) as well as pay in some 80% of union establishments (see Daniel and
Millward, 1983, pp.197 and 182).  However, it is worth noting that bargaining over
employment is very rare (Oswald and Turnbull, 1985).
3. Flexibility of working practices include, for example, operatives undertaking
minor maintenance on their machines rather than waiting for a maintenance engineer
to turn up.  A blatant example of inflexibility is the requirement that a "qualified"
electrician is required to change a light bulb.  Thus, for example, it has been noted
that in some UK hospitals, the involvement of no less than six employees is required
in order for a light bulb to be replaced.
4. There are, of course, numerous studies measuring cross-section correlations
between market structure and R and D intensity, for example, but these are not
informative on the main point at issue because they fail to control for the variation
in technological opportunities across industries.  Geroski (1990) uses panel data and
controls for the latter variable by including industry dummies, thereby generating
reliable results.
5. We were only able to match 66 companies which had adequate time series data
on settlements.
6. This is not quite correct because we adjust this variable so that it matches the
calendar year.  This may involve it taking the value N, say, in one year and 1-N in the
next (see data appendix for details).  This rules out the use of discrete variable
models (e.g. probit).
7. Note that the equation in estimated in first differences, so an agreement to
reduce restrictive practices is followed by a significant increase in total factor
productivity in the following year.
8. Recall that the denominator of our market share variable reflects 3-digit
industry sales and is not, therefore, congruent with the appropriate market.  This
makes the variable unsuitable for cross-section work but so long as 3-digit industry
sales are roughly proportional to the sales in the true market over time, then it is
perfectly adequate for time series analysis.  Since we are taking differences of market
share here, the results are essentially based on the time series variation in the data.
ENDNOTES
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DATA APPENDIX
The dataset consists of longitudinal data on 66 companies for which we can
merge information from the EXSTAT company database and the Confederation of
British Industries (CBI) Pay Databank.  The CBI data are available for 1979-86 and of
our 66 firms, 10 are present for 5 consecutive years, 7 for 6, 8 for 7 and 41 for 8.  So
the panel is unbalanced.  The CBI data provide information on pay increases and
reductions in restrictive practices.  All the other firm specific data come from the
EXSTAT database.
Firm specific variables
Output (y ).  Sales (EXSTAT item C31).  This is normalised on an industry specifici
price index.  See below.
Employment (n ).  Total employment (C19).  For a small number of firms (4), it isi
impossible to construct a consistent total employment series and we then use
domestic employment.
Capital stock (k ).  This is based on transforming net tangible assets at historic costi
into the same variable at current replacement cost and then normalising on the price
index for plant and machinery.  Details of the method are provided in S. Wadhwani
and M. Wall (1986).
Market share (mksh ).  Total sales in each industry (TSALS) is calculated as:i
TSALS  = N AVSALSjt j jt
where AVSALS  = average sales of a firm in industry j at year tjt
N  = number of firms in industry j in a chosen base year (1980)j
The number of firms is kept constant over years to correct for the changing firm base
of our sample.  (The sample used to obtain these data includes about 1200 firms
including all the major quoted companies in the industry.)  The market share is
obtained as Sales in firm in year t (EXSTAT item C31) ÷ TSALS .jt
Rent per unit of value-added (rents ).  The numerator is defined as Profits before taxi
(C34) + Depreciation (C51) + Interest Payments (C53+C54) - Capital Stock x (Real
interest rate + depreciation rate + risk premium).  The real interest rate we take to be
0.02812 which is the average 1981 value of the real gross redemption yield on 2%
index-linked stock (1996).  The depreciation rate + the risk premium we take to be
4%.
The denominator is Profits before tax (C34) + Depreciation (C51) + Interest
Payments (C53+C54) + Staff Costs (C63) + Amounts payable from Profit Sharing
Schemes (C72).  For 1982 and after, staff costs refer to total employment and include
social security and pension costs.  Prior to 1982 staff costs refer to domestic wages
and salaries only.  We have adjusted these to make them comparable to the post 1982
data.
Wage increase ()w ).  The CBI pay databank includes pay rise information for eachi
of up to three bargaining groups.  We use data on a manual bargaining group.  For
this bargaining group, the databank provides some information on (i) the month of
17
the pay settlement, (ii) a manager's estimate of the impact of the settlement on the
increase in gross average earnings in the coming calendar year and (iii) the actual
agreed pay increase.  In many cases (iii) is missing.  However, when both (ii) and (iii)
are available, they are nearly always the same.  So we take (ii) as our percentage pay
increase and then use (i) to allocate it over the two calendar years to which it
typically refers (the agreement is nearly always for 12 months).
Reduction in restrictive practices ()RRP ).  In the CBI survey of pay settlements,i
managers are asked whether a pay settlement also involved the removal of restrictive
practices.  The variable is a dummy which takes the value 1 if they respond in the
affirmative.  However, the settlement date is then used to allocate this variable across
the relevant two calendar years.  This is done because the removal of restrictive
practices is typically a process lasting for at least the period of the pay agreement, not
a one-off event taking place on the settlement date.  Around 38% of firms in the
sample removed restrictive practices at some point in the period 1980-86.
Profits (B ).  Profit before tax (C34).i
Borrowing ratio (br ).  This is a flow concept defined as Interest Payments (C53+C54)i
÷ [Profits before tax (C34) + Depreciation (C51) + Interest Payments (C53+C54) +
Constant].  The constant is set to be large enough to ensure the denominator is
always positive.  We also experimented with a stock version of the borrowing ratio,
essentially debt/debt + equity), but found that the flow version performed slightly
better.
Shock .  This is defined as -(n(1981)-n(1979)) for the years 1982-84, zero otherwise.i
Industry level variables
Unemployment rate (u ).  Source:  Employment Gazette.j
Concentration ratio (cr ).  Source:  Annual Census of Production, PA 1002, table 13.i
Import penetration (imp ).  Defined as imports ÷ home demand (sales + imports -j
exports).  Source:  Business Monitor MQ12 (collected by S. Machin).
Overtime hours (H ).  Weekly overtime hours per operative on overtime  x  fractionoj
of operatives on overtime.  Source:  Employment Gazette.
Standard hours (H ).  Normal weekly hours.  Source:  Employment Gazette.nj
Producer price index (P ).  Source:  British Business and unpublished data from thej
Business Statistics Office.  Used to normalise the sales data.
Aggregate variables
Unemployment rate (u).  Male unemployment rate.  Source:  Employment Gazette.
Aggregate wage (w).  Source:  S. Savouri (1989) Regional Data 1967-87, CLE Working
Paper 1135, London School of Economics.
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TABLE 1
Production Function 1982-86 (equation 19)
Dependent Variable:  (y -k )it it
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Equation description
Basic    Add
Independent equation CES term
variables     (1) (2)
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
*(y -k ) 0.36 (4.3) 0.30 (2.7)it it
*(n -k ) 0.70 (8.7) 0.18 (1.1)it it
 H /H 2.24 (2.5) 1.26 (1.2)ojt njt
10 (H /H ) 0.22 (1.0) 0.22 (0.8)-3 -1ojt njt
*(w -w )     0.54 (1.0) 1.27 (2.4)it-1 t-1
lnu               0.11 (2.7) 0.081 (2.1)jt-1
*R -0.17 (3.0) -0.15 (2.7)it-1
*(n -k ) -0.12 (2.9)it it
2
Serial correlation
(N(0,1)) -0.23 -0.68
Instrument validity P (26)=29.2 P (25)=25.42 2
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Notes
(i) The number of firms is 66 and the number of observations is 225.  Absolute
asymptotic t ratios in parentheses.
(ii) The dependent variable is (log real sales - log real capital stock).  All equations
are estimated in first differences and include both time dummies and 2 digit
industry dummies.
(iii) Starred variables are treated as endogenous.  Instruments include 
y (t-2,t-3,...), k (t-2,t-3,...), n (t-2,t-3,...).i i i
(iv) The equations are estimated in first differences using the Dynamic Panel Data
Package (DPD), written by M. Arrellano and S. Bond and described in
Arellano and Bond (1991).  The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
of general form.
(v) y = output, n = employment, k = capital, H  = overtime hours, o
H  = standard hours, w = wages, u = industry unemployment rate, R = leveln
of restrictive practices.
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TABLE 2
Structural Relationship Between Wages and Restrictive 
Practices 1981-86
(equation 24)
Dependent Variable:  )(w -w )it t
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Independent variables
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
*)(w )-w ) 0.68 (17.6)it-1 t
*)r 0.021 (3.7)it
Serial correlation (N(0,1)) 0.29
Instrument validity P (28) = 22.62
S))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Notes
(i) Number of firms is 66, number of observations is 231.  Asymptotic t ratios in
parentheses.
(ii) The equation includes time dummies.
(iii) Starred variables are treated as endogenous.  Instruments include n (t-2,t-3,...),i
)mkshi , )br , )(B/N) , shock , 2 digit industry dummies.it-2 it-2 it-2 it
(iv) As table 1, note (iv).
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TABLE 3
Wage and Effort Reduced Form Equations, 1981-86
(equations 22, 23)
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Dependent variable )(w -w ) )(w -w ) )RRP )RRPit t it t it it
1 2 3 4
Independent variable
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
*)(w -w ) 0.67 (16.5) 0.64 (9.3)it-1 t
  )ln u -0.12 (12.3) 0.056 (0.3)t
  )conc -0.0087 (0.4) -0.020 (0.6) 0.093 (0.2) -0.10 (0.2)jt-2
  )mksh 0.55 (2.0) 0.55 (1.1) -3.23 (1.0) -4.76 (1.5)it-2
 )(B /N ) 0.024 (4.6) 0.017 (2.1) )(B/P N ) -0.021 (2.0) -0.022 (2.0)it-2 it-2 i j i t-2
S)))))))Q - )wt        Wt
*)br -0.23 (3.3) -0.20 (2.5) 0.71 (1.9) 0.67 (1.6)it-1
10 Shock -1.26 (2.4) -0.51 (0.6) 0.26 (1.8) 0.27 (1.8)-2 it
Serial correlation (N(0,1)) 0.075 0.28 -0.36 -0.024
Instrument validity P (23)=26.8 P (23)=25.52 2
Time dummies x o x o
Industry dummies x x o o
S)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Notes
(i) Number of firms is 66, number of observations is 231.  Asymptotic t ratios in parentheses.
(ii) In columns 1, 2, the starred variables are treated as endogenous.  Instruments include n (t-2, t-i
3,...), w , two digit industry dummies.it-2
(iii) Equations in columns 1, 2 are estimated by IV using DPD.  In columns 3, 4, they are OLS
estimates.  In all cases, the standard errors are robust to general heteroskedasticity.
(iv) )w = proportion pay increase; )RRP  = 1 if restrictive practices are removed, = 0 otherwise; lni i
u = log aggregate unemployment rate; conc  = industry concentration ratio; mkshi  = marketj i
share; B/N = pre-tax profit per employee; br  = flow borrowing ratio; shock  = proportional falli i i i
in employment 1989-91 for the years 1982 to 1984, zero otherwise; P  = producer price index.j
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